To solve the problem that the data collected in crowdsensing systems are not reliable, a large number of truth discovery protocols have been proposed. However, most of them neglect the privacy protection existing in crowdsensing systems. Some truth discovery protocols that consider privacy only provide limited privacy protection, such as only protecting the privacy of collected data. To bridge the gap, in this paper, we propose a more comprehensive privacypreserving truth discovery protocol that can simultaneously protect the privacy of participants and truth results. Specifically, our protocol encrypts participants' observed data based on Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem. Then, through the interaction between two servers, we can calculate participants' weights and estimate the truth results in the encrypted domain. Moreover, based on the data perturbation technology, the privacy of sensitive data exchanged between the two servers is protected in our protocol. Theoretical analysis and experimental results demonstrate that our protocol can effectively protect the privacy of participants and truth results without losing the accuracy of truth results.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, crowdsensing has become an effective sensing paradigm where valuable data is collected by the crowd's mobile devices [2, 8, 9, 11, 17, 24] . Typically, two entities are involved in crowdsensing systems: one is the service provider who is in charge of releasing sensing tasks. The other is participants who are responsible for collecting data by their mobile devices. However, due to the lack of sensor calibration, the background noise, the incomplete observation and other reasons, participants' observed data are not always reliable. To address this problem, a large amount of truth discovery protocols have been proposed in [14, 15, 18-20, 26, 27, 29] to obtain accurate results, and most of them assign weights to participants according to their reliability. That is, participants will be assigned larger weights if they are more reliable. Meanwhile, the truth results are estimated by aggregating all participants' weighted data which combine participants' observed data with their weights. This process is repeated until the estimated truth results satisfy the convergence criteria. Notably, the good performance of these protocols has been verified.
Although the above protocols guarantee to output the accurate truth results, they fail to protect the privacy of participants and the service provider. Concretely, there are three types of privacy existing in crowdsensing systems: participants' observed data, participants' weights and the estimated truth results. If participants directly submit their observed data, their data privacy will be leaked out to the service provider. In this case, participants will be unwilling, even reject to participate in crowdsensing activities. Similarly, participants' weights should not be disclosed to the service provider either. This is because the service provider can manipulate participants' rewards according to their weights [1] . Besides, the estimated truth results should not be revealed to participants because, based on these results, malicious participants can fabricate false data to deceive the service provider to reduce the service quality of the service provider.
To address the above dilemma, several privacy-preserving truth discovery protocols have been proposed in [16, 21, 22, 25, 28] , where PPTD in [21] is the first privacy-preserving truth discovery protocol which adopts Threshold Paillier Homomorphic Encryption [3] to protect participants' data privacy. But we observe the curious service provider in this protocol can still infer participants' observed data in plaintext form. Meanwhile, the estimated truth results are disclosed to participants without any protection. Another protocol EPTD in [28] adopts the additive homomorphism and super-increasing sequence technology to achieve rigorous privacy protection. But in this protocol, participants' keys must be shared with each other, and the estimated truth results are also directly leaked out to participants. Different from the single-server model adopted in the above two protocols, the protocols in [22, 25] is based on two-server model to protect the privacy of participants. But participants' privacy is still likely to be leaked out in these protocols (e.g., participants' weights). Besides, another privacy-preserving truth discovery protocol based on differential privacy [5] [6] [7] 12 ] is proposed in [16] . But this protocol only provides limited privacy protection and sacrifices the accuracy of truth results. Therefore, how to design a more comprehensive privacy-preserving truth discovery protocol is meaningful and challenging.
In light of the above needs, in this paper, we propose a rigorous privacy-preserving truth discovery protocol (RPTD) which is based on the two-server model and homomorphic encryption technology to achieve more comprehensive privacy protection. Specifically, in RPTD, participants encrypt their observed data by Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem [23] and submit the ciphertexts to the servers. Then, without the interaction with participants, the two servers in RPTD can update participants' weights and estimate truth results. Since most of the calculations occur in the encrypted domain, the aforementioned three types of privacy can be protected in RPTD. Meanwhile, the data perturbation technology is used to protect the privacy of sensitive data exchanged between the two servers in RPTD. Besides, since most of the workload is shifted to servers' side, the computation and communication costs of participants are low in RPTD. In summary, the contributions of this paper are shown as follows.
• We propose a novel privacy-preserving truth discovery protocol in crowdsensing systems named RPTD. This protocol is based on additive homomorphic properties and data perturbation technology to achieve the more comprehensive privacy protection for participants and the service provider. • We provide the security analysis to demonstrate that our protocol can simultaneously protect the three types of privacy in crowdsensing systems: participants' observed data, weights and the estimated truth results. • The experimental results in this paper indicate that our protocol can obtain a similar accuracy of estimated truth results, lower computation and communication costs of participants compared with the existing work.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the system model, the adversary model and design goals of our protocol. Section 3 introduces the preliminaries of our protocol including a typical truth discovery protocol and Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem. Section 4 presents our protocol in detail. Section 5 provides the theoretical analysis for our protocol, and section 6 shows the experimental results. Finally, section 7 concludes this paper.
PROBLEM STATEMENT 2.1 System Model
Three entities are involved in our protocol as illustrated in Figure 1 : participants, the service provider and the key distributor. Specifically, the service provider is in charge of releasing sensing tasks and calculating truth results. In this paper, we assume the service provider will release M sensing tasks denoted as T = {T 1 ,T 2 , · · · ,T M }, and the estimated truth result on the m-th task is denoted as x * m . Meanwhile, we assume there are K participants in this model denoted as P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P K }, who are responsible for collecting data by their terminal devices. For P k , his weight is denoted as w k , and his observed data on T m is denoted as x k m . Besides, the key distributor is in charge of generating a pair of Paillier homomorphic keys: pk and sk. Meanwhile, he releases the public key pk to the other two entities and retains the private key sk in secret. The workflow of our model is described as follows.
1 ○ The key distributor generates pk and sk. Then, he distributes pk to the service provider and participants.
2 ○ The service provider releases M sensing tasks to K participants.
3 ○ Each participant collects his observed data and submits them to the service provider after encryption by pk. 4 ○ After receiving the observed data from all of the participants, the service provider updates participants' weights and estimates truth results by interacting with the key distributor. This step is iteratively executed until the estimated truth results satisfy the convergence criteria. 
Adversary Model & Design Goals
Similar to most of the existing work, we assume the three entities in above model are semi-honest [10] . That is, the three entities will strictly follow our protocol, but they are curious about other entities' sensitive information at the same time. Moreover, the key distributor is assumed to not collude with the other two entities, while the service provider is allowed to collude with some participants (Inspired by [4] , two non-collusive servers can be achieved by the economic incentive). Besides, some malicious participants will try their best to disclose the estimated truth and other participants' privacy by fabricating false data in our protocol.
In this paper, the main goal of our protocol is to protect the three types of privacy: participants' observed data, participants' weights and the estimated truth. Meanwhile, the accuracy of the estimated truth should be also guaranteed in our protocol. Besides, low computation and communication cost for participants is another goal in our protocol.
PRELIMINARIES 3.1 Truth Discovery
Truth discovery is an effective approach to obtain reliable results from conflicting data. In this section, we will introduce a state-ofthe-art truth discovery protocol-CRH [13] , which has excellent truth discovery performance on heterogeneous data, but does not consider privacy protection during the whole procedure. The key idea of this protocol is to assign weights to participants according to their reliability and estimate the truth by data aggregation. Besides, CRH consists of two phases: weight update and truth estimation.
Weight
Update. This phase aims to update participants' weights. In CRH, participants' weights are calculated based on the distances between their observed data and the estimated truth. Concretely, the k-th participant's weight can be calculated as follows.
Here, x * m is the estimated true in the previous iteration, which is a random value at the beginning of CRH. Meanwhile, we use d(·) to denote the distance function between participants' observed data and the estimated truth in (1) . Specifically, the k-th participant's distance function on T m is presented as follows.
Here, std m denotes the standard deviation of participants' observed data on T m and is calculated as follows.
x m in above equation denotes the average of participants' observed data on T m and is calculated by
. If participants' observed data is categorical data, the distance function is different, which is shown as follows.
Here, x * m and x k m are vectors with v dimensions which indicates there are v options for participants to select. If the p-th option is selected by P k on T m , the observed data is denotes as x k m = v (0, · · · , 0, 1 p , 0, · · · , 0). Similarly, the q-th option is selected on T m , the estimated truth is denoted as x * m = v (0, · · · , 0, 1 q , 0, · · · , 0).
Truth Estimation.
In this phase, to estimate the truth of sensing tasks, participants' weights are fixed. Specifically, the estimated truth on T m is calculated as follows.
For continuous data, we can directly calculate the above equation and easily obtain the estimated truth. However, for categorical data, since the nonzero elements in x k m for different participants are in different columns, the estimated truth x * m in above equation may be a vector with several nonzero elements. These nonzero elements indicate the probabilities of selecting the options in the corresponding columns. The option with the largest probability should be selected as the nonzero element in the estimated truth vector, and its other elements should be set as zero. The above two phases are executed iteratively until the estimated truth satisfies the convergence criterion.
Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem
Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem is an additively homomorphic cryptosystem which supports homomorphic addition, homomorphic scalar multiplication operations in the encrypted domain. That is, the results of the two operations calculated in the plaintext domain are equal to the decrypted calculation results in the encrypted domain. Suppose the ciphertext of the message m is denoted as ⟦m⟧ in Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem, then
Here, m 1 and m 2 denote two original messages, α denotes a constant. ⟦m 2 ⟧ −1 denotes the number-theoretic reciprocal of ⟦m 2 ⟧ on module n. That is, ⟦m 2 ⟧ · ⟦m 2 ⟧ −1 = 1 (mod n). The details of Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem is shown in Table 1 .
OUR PRIVACY-PRESERVING TRUTH DISCOVERY PROTOCOL
In this section, we will introduce our rigorous privacy-preserving truth discovery protocol (RPTD) in detail. Before the description for RPTD, one thing needs to be pointed out: for Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem, its encrypted objects must be integers, but participants' observed data in RPTD are likely to be the fixed-point decimal values. Therefore, in RPTD, participants' observed data need be rounded by rounding factors L. When the final estimated truth is obtained, we divide it by the corresponding rounding factors. For ease of description, participants' observed data in RPTD is rounded by default. Moreover, we will discuss the effect of rounding factors L in the experimental section. Next, we will introduce RPTD which is based on CRH and includes two phases: secure weight update and secure truth estimation. Key Generation: 1 randomly select big prime number p, q and ensure that дcd(pq, (p − 1)(q − 1)) = 1 2 calculate n = pq and λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) 3 randomly select a number д where д ∈ Z n 2 and ensure that (L(д λ mod n 2 )) −1 exists where L(x) = x −1 n 4 the public key pk is (n, д) and the private key sk is λ
Encryption: randomly select a number r ∈ Z n and calculate the ciphertext c = д m · r n mod n 2 where m is the original message Decryption:
calculate the plaintext m = L c λ mod n 2 L(д λ mod n 2 ) mod n
Secure Weight Update
Once obtaining the public key pk from the key distributor, participants will encrypt their observed data and submit the ciphertexts to the service provider. To securely update participants' weights, the service provider will take the following six steps and each step is executed in the encrypted domain with the assistance of the key distributor.
Step W1. In this step, the service provider calculates x m in the encrypted domain. Concretely, ⟦x m ⟧ is calculated as follows.
Here, x ′ m = K k =1 x k m . Due to 1 K , the above equation cannot be solved directly. To address this problem, the service provider interacts with the key distributor.
First, the service provider calculates ⟦x ′ m + r 0 ⟧ = ⟦x ′ m ⟧⟦r 0 ⟧ according to (5) and sends the result to the key distributor (Here, r 0 = r · K. r is generated randomly by the service provider and r ∈ Z n . r 1 to r 10 mentioned later are similar to r 0 ). When the key distributor receives this value, he decrypts it by using sk and obtains x ′ m + r 0 . Then, the key distributor calculates x ′ m +r 0 K and encrypts it by using pk (Notably, the result likely need to be rounded before encryption and we will not point out this later). Finally, the encrypted result Step W2. Although ⟦x m ⟧ has obtained, it is intractable for the service provider to directly calculate ⟦std m ⟧. From (3), we can find that securely calculating square operation and square root operation is the main challenge. To address it, the service provider can cooperate with the key distributor to work them out.
For square operation, (x k m − x m ) + r 1 is first calaculated by the service provider as follows.
Then, the service provider sends this result to the key distributor. After receiving it, the key distributor decrypts it and squares the decrypted result as follows.
The key distributor further encrypts the above result by using pk as follows.
The encrypted result ⟦sq⟧ is sent to the service provider and the service provider can obtain (x k m − x m ) 2 as follows.
Here, x k m − x m are calculated easily by the service provider. Finally, the service provider further calculates:
For square root operation, the service provider first calculates ⟦sum ·r 2 ⟧ = ⟦sum⟧ r 2 (Here, r 2 = r 2 and r 2 ∈ Z n ) and sends it to the key distributor to decrypt it. Then, the key distributor calculates sum ·r 2 K 1 2 and further encrypts it. Finally, the encrypted result is sent back to the service provider and he can obtain ⟦std m ⟧ as follows.
Here, 1 Step W3. In this step, to calculate d x k m , x * m , the service provider adopts the same method in step W2 to first calculate 
Next, the key distributor encrypts
and sends it to the service provider. Since the service provider can directly calculate
Step W4. In this step, the service provider intends to calculate log Dist k in the encrypted domain. Here, Dist k = M m=1 d(x k m , x * m ) and is calculated in the encrypted domain as follows.
Then, the service provider calculates ⟦r 5 · Dist k ⟧ and sends it to the key distributor. After recieving this value, the key distributor decrypts it and calculates its logarithm as follows.
Next, the key distributor encrypts the above result and sends it back to the service provider. Finally, the service provider can obtain log Dist k as follows.
⟦log
Step W5. After calculating Dist k , the service provider can adopt the same method in Step W4 to calculate log
Step W6. Based on Step W4, W5 and (1), the service provider can update the k-th participant' weight in the encrypted domain as follows.
Secure Truth Estimation
In this phase, participants' weights are fixed. According to (5) , the encrypted estimated truth x * m can be calculated as follows.
Here, sum w = K k =1 w k . To solve the above equation, the service provider takes the following three steps.
Step T1. In this step, the service provider calculates K k =1 w k · x k m .
First, the service provider sends ⟦w k +r 6 ⟧ = ⟦w k ⟧⟦r 6 ⟧ and r 7 · x k m = Step T2. Once obtaining K k =1 w k · x k m , the service provider
can calculate x * m = 1 sum w · K k=1 w k · x k m by following the method in Step W3. Since the service provider does not know w k , he calculates ⟦sum w ⟧ = K k =1 ⟦w k ⟧ first. Then, he sends ⟦r 8 · sum w ⟧ and r 9 · K k =1 w k · x k m to the key distributor (Here, r 8 is divisible by r 9 ). Next, the key distributor decrypts them simultaneously and calculates
Next, this result is encrypted and sent back to the service provider. Finally, the service provider can work out x * m as follows.
Step T3. Although ⟦x * m ⟧ has been obtained, the service provider cannot directly decrypt it due to the lack of sk. To obtain the estimated truth x * m , the service provider sends r 10 + x * m to the key distributor. Then, the key distributor decrypts it and sends the result x r m = r 10 + x * m back to the service provider. Finally, the service provider obtains x * m by calculating x * m = x r m − r 10 . The above two phases will be executed iteratively until the estimated truth satisfies the convergence criterion. Notably, the above introduction is based on the continuous data. For categorical data, the corresponding calculations should be changed to vector operations. Except for this point, the remaining processing on the categorical data is similar to that on continuous data. The RPTD can be summarized as Algorithm 1.
PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In RPTD, the three entities involved are semi-honest, and the key distributor is assumed to not collude with the other two entities. Under such conditions, the three types of privacy can be protected in RPTD (i.e., participants' observed data, weights and the estimated truth). Before providing rigorous proofs, we introduce the semantic security of Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem as follows.
Pr {c ← ⟦m 1 ⟧} − Pr {c ← ⟦m 2 ⟧} = ϵ.
Here, m 1 and m 2 are two original messages, c denotes the ciphertext of m 1 encrypted in Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem. Pr {c ← ⟦m 1 ⟧} and Pr {c ← ⟦m 2 ⟧} denote the probability that an attacker judges the message is m 1 or m 2 after he observes c. The ϵ is a polynomial which can be negligible (ϵ ′ , ϵ ′′ and ϵ ′′′ metioned The service provider with the key distributor calculates ⟦x m ⟧ and ⟦std m ⟧ according to (9) and (15); 6: Base on ⟦std m ⟧, the service provider calculates d x k m , x * m according to (16) together with the key distributor; 7: The service provider further calculates ⟦Dist k ⟧ and ⟦log Dist k ⟧ according to (17) The service provider works out x * m according to Step T2; 13: After obtaining x * m , the service provider with the key distributor decrypts it and obtains x * m at last; 14: end for 15: until The estimated truth satisfies the convergence criterion; 16: return The estimated truth x * m ;
later are similar to ϵ). This equation indicates that an attacker has no advantage to guess m 1 from m 1 and m 2 after he observes c in Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem. That is, in Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem, the ciphertexts do not disclose any information of the corresponding plaintexts. Based on this fact, next, we will prove the privacy of participants' observed data, weights and the estimated truth in RPTD.
Theorem 5.1. The privacy of participants' observed data is protected in RPTD.
Proof. For the service provider, suppose there exists the k-th participant so that his observed data x k m cannot satisfy semantic security, then
Here, x k ′ m denotes the k ′ -th participant's observed data. F (·) denotes RPTD, and c ′ denotes the result of The above equation indicates that the Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem does not satisfy semantic security on x k m which contradicts equation (23) . Therefore, for the service provider, the above assumption is not true, and the privacy of participants' observed data is protected. Notably, since participants' observed data are encrypted by Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem, the service provider cannot infer participants' observed data even if he can access the same ciphertexts in each iteration. That is, our protocol is historically secure.
For other participants, since they cannot access the k-th participant's observed data x k m , they have no larger probabilities to guess x k m between x k m and x k ′ m . That is
The above equation indicates that participants' observed data in RPTD can satisfy semantic security. That is, for other participants, the privacy of any participant's observed data in RPTD is preserved.
For the key distributor, participants' observed data is randomly perturbed by the service provider before he receives and decrypts it. Moreover, he does not collude with the service provider. Thus, the key distributor cannot infer participants' observed data, and the privacy of participants' observed data is protected.
In conclusion, in RPTD, the privacy of participants' observed data is protected. □ Theorem 5.2. The privacy of participants' weights is protected in RPTD.
Proof. For the service provider, suppose there exists the k-th participant so that his weight w k cannot satisfy semantic security, then
Here, w k ′ denotes the k ′ -th participant' weight. Since participants' weights are encrypted by Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem in RPTD, the above equation can be transformed as follows.
Pr
The above equation indicates that Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem does not satisfy semantic security on w k which contradicts equation (23) . Therefore, for the service provider, the above assumption is false. That is, the privacy of participants' weights is protected.
For other participants, since they cannot access the weight w k , they have no advantage to guess w k between w k and w k ′ . Then
Therefore, for other participants, participants' weights satisfy the semantic security in RPTD, and their privacy is protected. Similarly, the key distributor cannot infer participants' weights due to the data perturbation. In conclusion, the privacy of participants' weights is protected in RPTD. □ Theorem 5.3. The privacy of the estimated truth is protected in RPTD.
Proof. Since participants cannot access the estimated truth x * m , they have no larger probabilities to guess x * m between x * m and x * ′ m . Then
Therefore, for participants, the estimated truth in RPTD can satisfy the semantic security. Meanwhile, the key distributor cannot breach the privacy of the estimated truth due to the data perturbation. In conclusion, the above theorem holds up. □ From Theorem 1, Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, we can conclude that the privacy of participants' observed data, participants' weights and the estimated truth is protected in RPTD.
EXPERIMENT
In this section, we will evaluate the performance of RPTD. Since both RPTD and PPTD in [21] are based on encryption technologies to implement their protocols, we will compare their performance on continuous data and categorical data, respectively.
Experiment Configure
Our experiments are implemented on a laptop with Intel i5-5200U CPU @ 2.20GHz and 4GB RAM. The operating system is Windows 10 and the programming language is Java 1.8.0. We simulate the two protocols by different java programs. To implement the Paillier encryption in RPTD and PPTD, we adopt the pailliertoolbox 1 , and the security parameter k is set 512 bits (actually, this parameter can be set 1024 bits or longer for security demands).
In our experimets, we invite 10 volunteers as participants to collect continuous datasets. Their specific tasks are measuring the distances of 15 different location points in a teaching building. For each participant, he needs to measure his steps from one location point to another by using the pedometer in his smartphone. Then, he can calculate the distance value of the two location points by multiplying his steps with his step size, and these distance values are his observed data. Besides, the ground truth of these distances is manually measured by us. To collect categorical data, we also invite 10 volunteers as participants to answer 20 questions with 4 options. Each participant needs to choose one option for each question, and the ground truth is presupposed by us.
Experiment on Continuous Data
In this section, we will evaluate the performance of RPTD and PPTD on continuous data from four aspects: accuracy, convergence, computation cost and communication cost.
Accuracy. To compare the accuracy of RPTD and PPTD, we adopt two error functions MAE and RMSE used in CRH [13] , where MAE denotes the mean value of the absolute error between the estimated truth and the ground truth, while RMSE denotes the root mean square error between the estimated truth and the ground truth. In this experiment, we fix the number of participants and sensing tasks as 10 and 15, respectively. Meanwhile, we vary the 1 http://cs.utdallas.edu/dspl/cgi-bin/pailliertoolbox rounding factor L from 10 0 to 10 6 to observe the MAE and RMSE of CRH, PPTD and RPTD. Besides, we repeat this experiment 20 times and calculate the averages. The results are shown in Figure 2 . From Figure 2 (a), we can find that the MAE of RPTD is the largest compared with the other two protocols when the rounding factor L is small. This is because the majority of the processing in RPTD is executed in the encrypted domain. When L is small, the loss of information is the most in RPTD, which results in estimation errors. This situation is improved as L increases, and when L is larger than 10 1 , The three protocols have the same estimation errors. For the RMSE in Figure 2 (b), we can observe the similar results.
Convergence. To compare the convergence of RPTD and PPTD, we define an objective value:
A protocol is considered to have converged when its objective values vary in a very small range (e.g., 0.1, 0.01 and etc). In this experiment, we fix the rounding factor L as 10 6 and randomly select 5 different initialization objective values. Meanwhile, the number of iteration on each initialization value varies from 1 to 16. Besides, the number of participants and sensing tasks are fixed as 10 and 15, respectively. The results are shown in Figure 3 . As we can see, RPTD and PPTD have converged after two rounds of iterations no matter what the objective initialization values are. This indicates the two protocols can converge quickly. Computation Cost. Typically, the service provider and the key distributor are implemented by clouds with abundant resources. In contrast, participants' terminal devices have limited resources and computing power. Therefore, analyzing participants' performance is more meaningful. In this part, we will compare the computation cost of each participant in RPTD and PPTD.
In this experiment, we measure each participant's running time with the number of sensing tasks ranging from 1 to 15. The results are shown in Figure 4 , where we can find that the computation cost of participants in RPTD is lower than that in PPTD no matter the number of tasks. This is because the participants in RPTD only need to encrypt their observed data, while the participants in PPTD need not only encrypt their observed data but also involve in the subsequent process of truth discovery. This phenomenon can be easily observed in Figure 4(a) , where the computation cost of participants in PPTD consists of three parts: one is the cost of encryption denoted as PPTD-E, one is the cost of involving in weight update denoted as PPTD-W, another is the cost of involving in truth estimation denoted as PPTD-T. In contrast, the only computation cost for participants in RPTD is the encryption cost denoted as RPTD-E. Communication Cost. To compare the communication cost of participants in PPTD and RPTD, we assume that the intermediate values are S bits in the two protocols. In PPTD, K participants need to submit their M encrypted data to the service provider and the communication cost is MKS bits. Then, to calculate the std, participants are involved in calculating the x based on secure sum protocol. The size of communication cost is 2(t − 1)MS + MS = (2t − 1)MS bits (Here, t is the number of selected participants in secure sum protocol). After obtaining x, participants are involved in calculating std according to (3) based on secure sum protocol, and the communication cost is MKS + 2(t − 1)MS + MS = (2t + K − 1)MS bits. Next, to obtain w, participants need to involve in calculating Dist and log Dist, and the communication cost is 2MKS bits. According to (1) , participants are involved in calculating w based on secure sum protocol, and the total size of communication cost is 2(t − 1)MS bits. Finally, to calculate the estimated truth x * , participants need to involve in calculating K k =1 w k · x k and K k =1 w k , respectively. The communication cost is 2MKS + 2(t − 1)MS + 2(t − 1)MS = (4t + 2K − 4)MS bits. Therefore, in PPTD, the total size of communication cost for participants in each iteration is MKS
In RPTD, participants only need to receive the public key from the key distributor and submit their encrypted data to the service provider. The total size of the communication cost is 2MKS bits. Compared with PPTD, the communication cost of participants in RPTD is much lower.
Experiment on Categorical Data
In this section, we will compare the performance of RPTD and PPTD on categorical data from three aspects: accuracy, computation cost and communication cost.
Accuracy. To compare the accuracy of RPTD and PPTD, we adopt the error rate of participants' answers used in CRH. Since categorical data are integers, we vary the number of participants ranging from 3 to 10 rather than the rounding factor L to observe the error rates of the three protocols. The experimental result is shown in Figure 5 , where we can find that the error rate curves of the three protocols overlap completely, which indicates ciphertexts calculations in RPTD and PPTD cannot introduce more errors on categorical data. Computation Cost. In this part, we will compare the computation cost of each participant in RPTD and PPTD on categorical data. In this experiment, we vary the number of sensing tasks ranging from 2 to 20. The experimental results are shown in Figure 6 , where we can find that the computation cost of each participant in RPTD is lower than that in PPTD. This is because the participants in RPTD only need to encrypt their observed data, while the participants in PPTD also need to involve in the subsequent process of truth discovery. We can clearly observe this phenomenon from Figure 6(a) , where RPTD-E denotes the encryption cost of each participant in RPTD, while PPTD-W and PPTD-T denote each participant's cost for weight update and truth estimation in PPTD, respectively.
Communication Cost. To compare the communication cost of participants in PPTD and RPTD, we assume that the intermediate values are S bits. In PPTD, participants are directly involved in calculating Dist and log Dist on categorical data. In this case, the participants' communication cost is 2MKS bits. Then, they need to involve in calculating their weights based on secure sum protocol, and the communication cost is 2(t − 1)MS bits. To calculate the estimated truth x * , participants need to involve in calculating w k ·x k in the encrypted domain, and the size of communication cost is 2MKS bits. Besides, they need to involve in calculating K k =1 w k based on secure sum protocol, and the communication cost is 2(t − 1)MS bits. Therefore, the total size of the communication cost of participants in PPTD on categorical data is 2MKS + 2(t − 1)MS + 2MKS + 2(t − 1)MS = (4t + 4k − 4)MS bits. In contrast, the total communication cost of participants in RPTD is still 2MKS bits. It indicates that the participants' communication cost on categorical data in RPTD is also much lower than that in PPTD.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a rigorous privacy-preserving truth discovery protocol (RPTD) to tackle the privacy leakage problems existing in crowdsensing systems. Our protocol adopts the two-server model where a key distributor as one of the servers is introduced to assitant the service provider to perform truth discovery. To achieve privacy protection, our protocol is based on Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem and data perturbation technology to achieve secure weight update and secure truth estimation, where the estimated truth is calculated in the encrypted domain. The security analysis in this paper has proved that our protocol can protect the three types of privacy: participants' observed data, participants' weights and the estimated truth. Besides, the comparative experiments have demonstrated that our protocol has good performance in accuracy, convergence, the computation and communication costs of participants.
